The Wrath of Washington
Todd W. Braisted
“We are Starving, and unless something very efficacious for the supply of the Army is done, very speedily, we must disband, or turn free Booters – an evil of almost as much Magnitude as the first.” So wrote Continental Army Major General Arthur St, Clair on September 5th 1780. He was sending a less than subtle warning to Pennsylvania President Joseph Reed, stating in no uncertain terms that if Congress did not take steps to immediately supply Washington’s troops, the army would take matters into its own hands. This was not some rogue general spouting off to make an idle threat. Washington himself the week before had informed Congress “Altho the Troops have upon every occasion hitherto borne their want with unparralled patience, it will be dangerous to trust too often to a repetition of the causes of discontent.” The date was August 1780. The place was Bergen County.
The dire food situation aside, it was an exciting time for the Continental Army and the fledgling United States. Washington had accumulated a force of 14,000 troops, encamped in Orange Town, just north of Bergen County. At Newport, Rhode Island, 5,000 French troops and a naval force had arrived from France, with the promise of more to come. After a year of setbacks, particularly in the south, Washington appeared poised to commence operations to take back New York City, the city he lost to the British in 1776. Before that could happen however, he needed food for his army, for immediate use, that would have to come from Bergen County.
On August 23rd, described as a “sultry hot” day, Washington led his force in two columns south, some traveling through Closter, others Schraalenburgh, marching some ten to twelve miles. The following day operations commenced to forage the countryside, obtaining cattle and all manner of crops. Major General the Marquis de la Fayette led the Continental Light Infantry completely down Bergen Neck, even skirmishing with British sentries at Paulus Hook and across the kill on Staten Island.
The operations were successful, gathering enough food from the inhabitants regardless of their loyalty to sustain only their present wants. The countryside would be stripped within ten days, with the men once again without any meat for multiple days at a time. Being suddenly in a country with the (temporary) means to alleviate their poor condition quickly led to a breakdown in discipline. Brigadier General Ebenezer Huntington wrote from Teaneck “The rascality of our troops was equal to the British. They plundered the inhabitants villainously, and I believe offered that violence to some for which the British are universally condemned. One of the Pennsylvania line was immediately hung up for his conduct without ceremony.” Major General Nathanael Greene fumed to Washington “There has been committed some of the most horrid acts of plunder by some of the Pennsylvania line that has disgraced the American Arms during the War. The instances of plunder and violence is equal to anything committed by the Hessians.”
These initial operations placed the Continental Army in a position it had not been in since November 1776, operating between the Hudson and Hackensack Rivers. At that time, 5,000 British troops under Lord Cornwallis had climbed the Palisades at the Lower Closter Dock (or Closter Landing), and forced Washington’s troops to fly over the Hackensack and then Passaic Rivers, starting the Great Retreat across New Jersey. Washington wanted no repeat of that. To prevent a repeat, Washington turned to some of Bergen County’s own troops to guard the critical path up the Palisades.
The Palisades, rising hundreds of feet above the west side of the Hudson River, provided a natural barrier against large scale troop movements. There were however a few trails up the cliffs, available for any enterprising officer to lead his men up. Since Cornwallis had used this path in 1776, it had been utilized by a number of British and Loyalist commanders to make incursions into northern Bergen County. The path, described as one-half mile in length and rising at the rate of one foot in five, in 1780 was viewed by Brigadier General Wayne as “ at present Obstructed by felled trees & large rocks so that nothing but single footmen can pass & that with difficulty – a few infantry might defend the avenue –.” That was what Washington was counting on.
The force Washington intended to guard against being trapped on Bergen Neck would be the New Jersey State Troops commanded by Major John Mauritius Goetschius of Schraalenburgh (Dumont). Goetschius’ regiment was a temporary formation, enlisted for six months, and consisting of about 150 officers and men drawn from the militia of Bergen, Essex, Morris and Somerset counties. Bergen’s contribution was 26 men, commanded by Captain Thomas Blanch of Harrington Township (Norwood). Raised for service starting July 1st, the men had been lately stationed, much to their grumbling, just over the border at a blockhouse being constructed to secure the west side of Dobb’s Ferry, in modern Palisades, New York. From this post, known as Sneden’s Landing, they were directed to patrol from Closter to Fort Lee, a large extent of country. Early that August, Goetschius would unsuccessfully complain that his corps had been raised for the express purpose of defending Bergen County, a task not possible from a post over the border in New York. That would change later in the month.
When Washington’s Army entered Bergen County that August day, they literally trod some of the same roads that Cornwallis marched over in November 1776. Being no fool, Washington wanted to take steps to avoid history repeating itself. Apparently not wishing to detach Continental troops from their foraging mission, Washington called upon Goetschius and his state troops, no doubt figuring they would appreciate the opportunity to serve in Bergen County. Wanting to impress the seriousness of the situation upon his whole army, Washington stated in public orders “The Army being now very near the Enemy the General flatters himself every officer and soldier will make it a point of honor as well as duty to keep constantly in Camp and to be at the shortest Notice ready to act as Circumstances may require. He is at the same time persuaded should an opportunity be afforded us that every part of the army will vie with each other in the display of that conduct fortitude and bravery which ought to distinguish troops fighting for their Country, for their Liberty, for everything dear to the Citizen or to the soldier.” He had no doubt Goetschius’ state troops would need no additional animation in undergoing whatever hardships they faced in guarding the passes. In this, he was mistaken,
The actual strength of the guard ordered, and their specific orders are not known. It is apparent however that it should have mustered at least fifty men, commanded by a captain. That captain would Thomas Blanch. Blanch, by his own admission was tasked with guarding both the upper and lower Closter landing spots, the upper being about 1½ miles above the lower, and with a path as steep as twenty degrees and “Impracticable for Waggons.” To these crucial passes, Blanch placed a sergeant at the upper landing and a subaltern’s guard at the more widely used lower landing, probably about a dozen men. Why not himself and the rest of the men? As he explained to Washington, “having no tents to Shelter us from the weather” and “much Necessitated for provisions” Blanch decided to keep himself and the bulk of the guard at their post across the border at Sneden’s Landing. “Please to inform me if not right” wrote Blanch to Washington in his letter of August 24th from Closter, presumably before returning to more comfortable quarters.
Blanch was in fact “not right” as Washington informed him the same day. Writing from his headquarters at Liberty Pole, the Continental commander-in-chief tore into the Bergen County captain: “I cannot help expressing exceeding great surprise at your not obeying the orders you received yesterday, to take post with the men under your command at the Closter landings. Nor do I see how you could have answered it to yourself and your Country, if any disaster had happened in consequence of your neglect.” As for their lack of tents Washington showed little sympathy, explaining in strained tones “Our Army before now has been almost a whole Campaign without Tents. And this spring were from the 6th of June till sometime in July without a single one for either officers or men (making use of bush Bowers) as a substitute.” There was no food to send them either, the suggestion being to take it from the inhabitants and give them a receipt for the value. Blanch was once again ordered, with all his men, to take post at the landings, closing with “I shall expect the most pointed compliance with these orders.”
The incident soon passed without further mention. No British forces did (or ever intended) to repeat their 1776 ascent. As August turned to September, Washington’s Army crossed over New Bridge and set up camp in Steenrapie, extending several miles up Kinderkamack Road to modern Oradell. There they would remain for two weeks while events unfolded elsewhere, seen an unseen. There would be no attack on New York, owing to the 2nd division of French troops and ships being held up in France and the disastrous defeat in South Carolina at the Battle of Camden, the news of both reaching Washington the first week of September. As for Thomas Blanch, he would continue to serve in Goetschius’ State Regiment through the remainder of their term of service, which expired at the end of December 1780. Blanch at that point resumed his duties as captain in the Bergen County Militia, actively engaged against Loyalist troops. He would have the dubious distinction of being among the very last men of Bergen County being taken prisoner. Blanch was one of four militia accompanying Cornelius Haring, a commissioner for forfeited estates, in an attempt to confiscate the estate of Loyalist Michael Van Tuyl on Bergen Neck (probably in modern Bayonne). Seeing Van Tuyl being marched a prisoner to Hackensack, ten Loyalists under Captain Ebenezer Ward, out hunting, freed Van Tuyl and took prisoner Blanch and the others, sending them to the provost in New York City. The date was Friday, 31 January 1783. Blanch and the others were soon released, but for him, and everyone else, the war was nearly over.